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This paper explores the balancing act between freedom of expression and hate speech. It takes its 
cue from a recent dialogue between Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron concerning democratic 
legitimacy. This dialogue forms the conceptual starting point for the paper, and a detailed analysis 
of democratic principles will follow. Robert Post’s participatory theory of democracy is critiqued, 
and his recent conversion to democratic relativism is analysed. The operation of hate speech laws 
in Canada and New Zealand will both be assessed in order to see how both of these countries treat 
the issue of democratic legitimacy.  
Word length: 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14500 words. 
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‘The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate. It is a safety valve: people are more 
ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle seek to influence them.’1  Lord 
Steyn 
‘Look, I don't see why bad artists - I mean artists who are obviously incompetent...why they should 
be presented hypocritically as good artists just because they're supposed to be advancing the 
frontiers of freedom of expression or...demonstrating that there should be no limit on subject 
matter.’2 Anthony Burgess  
I Introduction 
Generally, freedom of expression is considered fundamental to democracy. The above quotation 
from Lord Steyn explains why. For a state to pass legitimate laws governing its citizens, the citizens 
must be able to have their say on what those laws should be. Freedom of expression is not absolute, 
however, and there are many exceptions. The exception this paper will focus on is ‘hate speech’. 
When expression or speech exposes sections of society to hatred is where many states choose to 
intervene. The issue has occupied states for centuries, and for different reasons. For example, 
Tiberius Gracchus controversially executed any soldier who denigrated the ex-slaves among them, 
for fear of military disharmony.3  
Over two thousand years later, the correct legal approach to hate speech is no closer to being settled. 
The Danish cartoon controversy of 2006, where derogatory caricatures of Muhammed resulted in 
deadly outrage, fomented fresh debate as to where to draw the line.4 Inspired by this and other 
topical issues of freedom of expression, two recent anthologies have illuminated the debate. Ronald 
Dworkin provides the Foreword to Extreme Speech and Democracy.5 In the space of five pages, 
Dworkin constructs an elegant and succinct defence of freedom of expression: hate speech laws are 
said to spoil the democratic legitimacy of the states that enact them. In The Content and Context of 
Hate Speech, Jeremy Waldron’s essay directly responds to and rebuts Dworkin’s position.6  The two 
positions form the conceptual bases of this paper, and both will be expanded upon and critiqued.  
                                                             
1 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [1999] 3 WLR 328 (HL) at 337. 
2 Anthony Burgess Earthly Powers (Vintage Books, London, 2004) at 311.  
3 Niccoló Machiavelli The Discourses (Penguin Classics, London, 1984), Book II.  
4 See Christopher Hitchens “God-Fearing People” Slate (July 2007) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/fighting_words/2007/07/godfearing_people.html 
5 Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2009). 
6 Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and 
Responses (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012).  
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This paper will offer a brief overview of what is commonly defined as ‘hate speech’ and the 
international framework encompassing it. The philosophical divide between the United States and 
other Western democracies will be explained. This will provide the contextual background to 
detailed discussion about democratic legitimacy, in which the dialogue between Waldron and 
Dworkin will be analysed.  This dialogue will be supplemented by key theoretical principles, such as 
state neutrality and democratic relativism. After finding more force in the arguments proffered by 
hate speech prohibitionists, this paper will then see how the principle of democratic legitimacy is 
treated in the Commonwealth states of Canada New Zealand. This paper will conclude by exploring 
recent developments in both countries’ jurisprudence.  
II Hate Speech and the International Framework 
A International Obligations 
‘Hate speech’ is generally taken to refer to conduct that may incite violence towards or bring into 
contempt a group of people identifiable on grounds such as race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.7 
The effects of hate speech are considered harmful enough that many states have prohibited such 
conduct even if violence is not a likely outcome. The geneses for most modern hate speech laws are 
the international obligations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).8 
Although Article 19 of the ICCPR states that everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression,9 Article 20 tapers this by stating that ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’.10 The 
ICERD, enacted in 1965 in response to widespread anti-Semitism,11 similarly calls upon signatories 
to legislate against ‘all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred’.12  
B The United States Anomaly  
Most signatories to the ICCPR and ICERD accepted their obligations to legislate against hate 
speech. The United States was a notable exception.13 The ‘First Amendment tradition’ guarantees a 
                                                             
7 Bhikhu Parekh “Is There a Case for Banning Hate Speech?” in Herz, Michael and Peter Molnar (eds.) The 
Content and Context of Hate Speech (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 37 at 40.  
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(opened for signature 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969).  
9 ICCPR, art 19.  
10 ICCPR, art 20.  
11 Natán Lérner The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (BRILL, 
London, 1980) at 1. 
12 ICERD, art 4.  
13 The United States Senate made a reservation to the ICERD stating ‘That the Constitution and laws of the 
United States contain extensive protections of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. 
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very broad right to freedom of expression.14 Unless the speech in question is likely to incite 
imminent lawless action, it is protected under the United States Constitution. This is known as the 
‘Brandenburg Principle’, named after the 1969 case where the Supreme Court held that a Ku Klux 
Klan rally in an isolated Ohio farm was a protected form of expression.15  
Since Brandenburg, the United States Supreme Court has stridently permitted hate speech that falls 
below the ‘imminent lawless action’ threshold.16 The United States is something of a lone wolf in 
this regard. In its first report on the United States in 1995, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee stated that it ‘regrets the extent’ of the United States’ reservations, declarations and 
understandings.17 These had the effect of ensuring the United States ‘has accepted only what is 
already the law of the United States’. Conversely, laws prohibiting the denial of the Holocaust are 
commonplace in Europe. Julie Suk noted that ‘[t]o the American legal mind, the punishment of 
Holocaust denial would not even constitute a hard case: such a prohibition would be a paradigmatic 
violation of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee’.18  
III Dworkin’s Foreword 
A The Need for a Democratic Background 
One of these American legal minds is the late Ronald Dworkin. His Foreword in a 2009 anthology 
presented a contemporary exposition of why hate speech must be protected.19 Dworkin approvingly 
notes the famous US case of Skokie, where neo-Nazis were permitted to carry swastikas through a 
town of Holocaust survivors.20 Dworkin uses the same principled bases to defend the rights of 
novelists in furthering intellectual boundaries that he does to defend the rights of swastika-laden 
racists. He cites the most famous defence of free speech, John Stuart Mill’s reasoning in On 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Accordingly, the United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under articles 
4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other measures, to the extent that they 
are protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States’. 
14 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that ‘Congress shall make no law…abridging 
the freedom of speech’.  
15 Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969).  
16 The ‘First Amendment tradition’ is in fact relatively new. As late as 1952, a conviction for group defamation 
was upheld. The case, Beauharnais v Illinois, concerned a white supremacist who had distributed racist leaflets 
urging whites to unite and protect themselves against blacks. The conviction was upheld even though it was 
found that there was no ‘clear and present danger’. Although Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled, 
but it has been thoroughly undermined and practically gutted. See generally Bernard Schwartz The Warren 
Court: A Retrospective (Oxford University Press, New York,1996).  
17 United Nations Human Rights Committee “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America” UN Doc A/50/40 (1995) at [279].  
18 Julie C. Suk “Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory of the State” in Michael 
Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 144 at 144.  
19 Ronald Dworkin, Foreword, in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009).  
20 National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie 432 US 43 (1977).  
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Liberty.21 Mill believed that hate speech should be permitted, because when ideas are ‘vigorously 
and earnestly contested’, truth will emerge.22 Therefore, in a war of words, the intellectual 
dishonesty of bigots will not stand up to reasoned debate. For Mill, unless the reasons for free speech 
are valid in an extreme case, they are not valid in any case.23  
Dworkin rejects this philosophical argument. For many religious people, for instance, their long-held 
convictions already form the truth and they will not be swayed by a Millian thought experiment. 
Nor, as Dworkin notes, have we had much evidence that racist speech will contribute ‘to its own 
refutation’.24 Instead, Dworkin examines the principle of democratic legitimacy.  
A democracy must take into account the voices of its people. If, Dworkin argues, a state passes a law 
in a manner that ‘respects each individual’s status as a free and equal member of the community’, 
then it can be said to be legitimately imposing a collective decision.25 Of course, the immediate 
counterpoint is that majoritarian laws are generally deemed sufficient expressions of the will of the 
people. Dworkin argues, however, that these principles form merely a necessary condition of 
democratic legitimacy, rather than a sufficient one. A ‘democratic background’ is needed – everyone 
must have a voice alongside their vote.26 Otherwise, ‘the majority has no right to impose its will on 
someone who is forbidden to raise a voice in protest or argument or objection before the decision is 
taken’.27  
B Upstream and Downstream Laws 
Dworkin distinguishes between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ laws concerning hate speech. This 
paper will employ the same analogy. Upstream laws are directly focussed at hate speech; for 
example, banning racial slurs against minorities. These contrast to downstream laws, which protect 
people that are the target of hate speech; this category includes laws against discrimination in the 
workplace, specific laws against hate crimes, and the right of equal opportunity. Dworkin is an 
advocate for downstream laws, stressing the need to protect against unfairness in civil society by 
enacting legislation. But, upstream laws are not permitted in his concept of democratic legitimacy. If 
pre-emptive state intervention forbids expressions or prejudices that foment unfairness, then the 
collective opinion has been ‘spoiled’28. The state then loses its justification to pass downstream laws, 
as they will lack democratic legitimacy. In other words, to cautiously extend Dworkin’s metaphor, 
we cannot muddy the water and then sell it as pure.  
                                                             
21 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (John W. Parker & Son, London, 1859).  
22 Chapter 2.  
23 Dworkin, Foreword, above n 19, at vii. 
24 At vii. 
25 At vii.  
26 At vii.  
27 At vii.  




C Do Upstream Laws Prevent Political Discussion? 
One immediate objection is that extreme speech generally does not consist of coherent political 
discussion. To return to the landmark Skokie decision, it is unclear what political purpose carrying 
swastikas through a community of Holocaust survivors served. This would have simply inflicted an 
immense affront to the Jewish community’s dignity.29 Therefore, it could be said that upstream laws 
banning this type of invective do not de-legitimatize laws against discrimination.  Dworkin, 
however, goes further, and does not limit the argument to productive political speech. He argues that 
policy and legislation are rooted in a community’s ‘moral and cultural environment’ rather than in 
political speeches and pamphlets.30 This is true – in liberal democracies, electoral campaign 
promises are largely shaped from popular opinion, and not the other way around. Therefore, a 
decision imposed on the collective can only be democratically legitimate if everyone has their 
chance to contribute to the moral environment, no matter how informally and vile they choose to do 
so. If citizens choose to contribute to this environment by marching swastikas through a town of 
Holocaust survivors – so long as imminent lawless action is not likely to follow - then they must be 
allowed to have their say in this way for the sake of democratic legitimacy.   
IV Dworkin’s General Theory of Legitimacy 
Legitimacy carries a multitude of meanings, so it is important to identity in what sense Dworkin uses 
the term. Dworkin appears to have meant legitimacy in one of two ways: either that there is a 
political obligation to obey the downstream laws, or that force can be appropriately used to uphold 
the downstream laws. To expand on this, it is necessary to explore Dworkin’s earlier text on 
legitimacy and democracy.  
In a 2006 text, Dworkin explained the link between political legitimacy and equal concern.31 In order 
for a state’s coercive power to be legitimate, the state must satisfy certain moral conditions. Dworkin 
requires the state to act in a certain way so its citizens are morally obliged to obey it. He proposes 
two principles of human dignity: the principle of intrinsic value, and the principle of personal 
responsibility. The first principle holds that each human life has a special kind of objective value, so 
one should regret a moral injustice regardless of where and to whom it occurs.32 The latter principle 
                                                             
29 The past conditional tense is used here because although the neo-Nazis won the legal battle, they chose to 
march in Chicago away from any Jewish neighbourhood. See Michael Rosenfeld “Hate Speech in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The Content and Context of Hate Speech (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2012) at 254-255.  
30 At viii.  
31 Ronald Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2006) at 94.  
32 At 10.  
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holds that ‘each person has a special responsibility for realizing the success of his own life’.33 The 
legitimacy of a state is found by accepting these two principles as constraints on its actions, and 
acting consistently with these two principles. If the state acts illegitimately, citizens do not have any 
moral obligation to accept the state’s coercive powers. Because each life has intrinsic value, the state 
must show ‘an equal concern for each of the people over whom it claims dominion’.34 Also, because 
dignity involves personal responsibility, a democratically legitimate state requires a feeling of self-
government. A legitimate state cannot expect its citizens to submit to its authority if they are denied 
a role in the decision-making process. 
Dworkin’s above explanation of political legitimacy was in the context of taxation, but it is meant as 
a universally applicable concept. Both principles can be found in his arguments against upstream 
laws. The existence of upstream laws, in Dworkin’s view, entails that a state is not treating its 
citizens with equal concern; for example, citizens with racist views would be denied forms of 
expression that are important to them. Upstream laws do not allow for self-government because they 
deny sections of society the chance to participate in and shape the political community whatever way 
they see fit. 
V Identifying Illegitimacy 
Dworkin’s argument is an elegant one, but needs further unpacking. The upstream-downstream 
analogy can be interpreted in different ways. On a narrow reading, the upstream laws only affect the 
democratic legitimacy of legislation passed directly downstream; that is, legislation directly aimed at 
preventing discrimination on grounds such as race. This is where the analogy makes the clearest 
sense. Upstream and downstream laws are both aimed at the same outcome, and the legitimacy issue 
is focussed on when it is appropriate for the state to step in. On a broader reading, the upstream laws 
affect the legitimacy of every other piece of legislation. This seems to be the logical implication of 
Dworkin’s comments on the ‘moral and cultural environment’. All laws will have suffered from 
diminished legitimacy when a section of society is barred from fully contributing to that 
environment, and the downstream laws merely serve as the clearest example of this.  
Dworkin has previously proposed a type of in personam approach to democratic legitimacy: 35 
     ‘I can have no obligation to a community that treats me as a second-class citizen; the apartment 
government of South Africa had no legitimate authority over blacks…South Africa could not claim any 
political allegiance from its black citizens because its disregard of the equal importance of their lives was 
total’.  
                                                             
33 At 10.  
34 At 5.  
35 Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here?, above n 31, at 96.  
11 
 
This suggests that downstream laws lose their illegitimacy in respect of the citizens that object to the 
upstream laws. Robert Post approaches democratic legitimacy through the same in personam lens, 
arguing that ‘if a state were to forbid the expression of a particular idea, the government would 
become, with respect to individuals holding that idea, heteronomous and nondemocratic’.36 As 
Waldron notes, however, this seems superficial given the generality of hate speech laws – they apply 
to everyone, even if enforcement will only be necessary for a select few.37 Also, one objective of 
upstream laws is to have a moulding effect on everyone’s future conduct. So, an in personam 
approach to democratic legitimacy is ill-fitting. Either upstream laws are democratically legitimate 
as applied to everyone, or they are not. Dworkin appears to agree with Waldron in the Foreword, 
arguing that upstream laws spoils the moral obligation of everyone to obey and respect the state’s 
coercive power.38 
VI What Happens Next? 
It is unclear from Dworkin how citizens can demonstrate their dissidence from ‘illegitimate’ 
upstream laws. If majoritarian procedures (such as representative democracy) are not enough, and if 
the majority has no right to impose their will on a silenced minority, then there seems to be serious 
consequences. Dworkin dials it back later in the Foreword, saying that it is simply ‘unfair’ to impose 
upstream laws on the wider community.39 He does not say what the consequences should be. An 
analogy may be drawn with his earlier work on taxation and legitimacy. Dworkin argued that if an 
otherwise legitimate state has taxation laws that show contempt for the poor, citizens may be morally 
entitled to a ‘limited and targeted civil disobedience’ but not to full-scale rebellion.40 Perhaps, then, 
hate speech proponents may likewise be entitled to such civil disobedience if anti-discrimination 
measures have been enacted whilst their voices cannot be heard. This, of course, is not an exact 
science, and the point at which disobedience becomes morally acceptable is impossible to divine.   
If his argument is accepted, then the troubling conclusion is that almost all democracies have spoilt 
their legitimacy: countries such as Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Norway, and New 
Zealand (to name a few) are all deficient in legitimacy due to their upstream laws.41 The 
consequences sit uneasily. For example, can a New Zealand employer ignore the Human Rights Act 
and discriminate against Māori in recruitment, because his voice has been stifled by upstream laws? 
                                                             
36 Robert Post “Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment” Wm. & Mary L. Rev 32 (1991) 267 at 290. 
37 Jeremy Waldron “Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The 
Content and Context of Hate Speech (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 329 at 334.  
38 Dworkin, above n 19, at viii.  
39 At viii.  
40 Dworkin, above n 31, at 97.  
41 For example, the extremely broad s 153A of the Indian Penal Code criminalises speech that ‘promotes, or 
attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any 
other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will’. See Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 
1860, s 153 (1) (a).  
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After all, the employer was inherently stifled from properly expressing his opinion on the 
downstream laws that govern him. It is hoped that public opinion would answer this in the negative; 
civil disobedience could look oxymoronic in this context. The nature of illegitimate laws, however, 
is that they may not have to be followed. Dworkin certainly argues this much. Therefore, this paper 
will draw upon Waldron’s rebuttal and then will expand its scope to include key principles for and 
against Dworkin’s position.   
VII Waldron and Legitimacy 
A Degrees of Legitimacy? 
Waldron has written extensively and incorrigibly in defence of hate speech laws. His writings on the 
subject largely focus on how hate speech breaches a fundamental human right: dignity, or a basic 
social standing in society.42 In his recent book The Harm in Hate Speech, he devotes a chapter to the 
legitimacy concerns.43 He argues strongly that Dworkin’s argument lends itself to a more moderate 
approach, and questions whether or not legitimacy is a matter of degree. Waldron claims that by 
saying upstream laws ‘spoil’ the legitimacy of downstream laws, Dworkin actually means that they 
diminish the legitimacy.44 Indeed, Waldron finds Dworkin in an earlier text noting that legitimacy is 
not all or nothing.45  
Waldron examines hypothetical dissent from an antidiscrimination bill.46 One person may dissent 
because he espouses a racial theory that a minority group is scientifically inferior to others in 
intelligence. Another person may dissent by printing a leaflet comparing that minority group to 
cockroaches.47 The latter expression is almost certainly banned by existing hate speech laws, 
whereas the former might be permissible. Apart from narrowly targeted upstream laws such as 
Holocaust denial bans, there exists a general spectrum of toleration in countries’ approaches to hate 
speech. Waldron argues that if hate speech laws are only targeted at the more obscene and 
vituperative end of the spectrum, any deficit in democratic legitimacy is very minor. Once this 
difference is established, then it becomes easier to perform a balancing act – if upstream laws have 
vitally important objectives and are reasonably implemented, then ‘complaints [about democratic 
legitimacy] may be much less credible as a result’.48 This paper agrees  that the notion of degrees of 
democratic legitimacy is a strong proposition in dealing with hate speech and, indeed, could be taken 
                                                             
42 Jeremy Waldron Dignity, Rank and Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2012).  
43 Jeremy Waldron The Harm of Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2012). 
44 At 188. 
45 Ronald Dworkin Is Democracy Possible Here?, above n 31, at 97.  
46 Waldron The Harm of Hate Speech, above n 43, at 189.  
47 Presumably, the reference here is to the 1994 Rwandan genocide which was in part fuelled by infamous 
broadcasts by the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines.  
48 At 192.  
13 
 
further: politically, racial denigrations dressed up as science may be more damaging than a pamphlet 
comparing minorities to cockroaches.49  
B Is the Debate Over? 
Waldron’s second argument is not as persuasive. Mill believed that as we progress as a society, 
doctrines of truth will become firmer and there will be a gradual ‘cessation of serious controversy’.50 
Waldron outlines that in an earlier era, certain races were regarded as inferior to others, but we have 
moved on. Waldron notes that ‘there is no longer any intelligent contestation on this issue…the 
fundamental debate about race is over – won; finished’.51 Dworkin’s insistence that the racist outliers 
have their say on antidiscrimination laws is thus misguided, as they have nothing material to 
contribute. Waldron questions the need for democratic legitimacy to depend on giving racists the 
freedom to hatefully vent ‘so that the losers have a chance to persuade the majority of the truth of 
their position the next time around’.52  
Apart from being unintentionally dictatorial – the above quotation could be a criticism of a 
democratic election, after all – Waldron’s argument rests on unsettled grounds. That a particularly 
fundamental debate is over could be (and is) just as emphatically claimed by the targets of upstream 
laws. It is wished that Waldron’s view of history was the case; sadly, it is not. Logically, if there has 
been a cessation of serious controversy on issues of race, then there would be no need for hate 
speech laws (nor, perhaps, for any anti-discrimination laws). These upstream laws attempt to not 
only shape future generations, but also to stifle pre-existing problems of racial disharmony.  
The 1990s saw the Balkans implode amidst violent racial ideologies. In the twenty-first century, 
racial chants and slogans are seen at football stadia all over Europe.53 Other common targets of hate 
speech, on grounds of religion or sexuality, are not spared either. The Danish cartoon controversy 
saw retribution from Muslims, who saw the cartoons as hateful of their religion. In the writing of this 
paper, the Indian Supreme Court reinstated a 153-year old colonial law which defined a same-sex 
relationship as an ‘unnatural offence’, carrying a ten-year jail term.54 Here, then, are recent examples 
of the serious controversy failing to cease in regards to common targets of hate speech. Waldron’s 
claim is admirable but quixotic. The claim has not manifested itself in many modern societies. 
Referring to the Balkans, Stephen Holmes rightfully points out that certain kinds of speech may 
                                                             
49 See the classic example of Richard Hernstein and Charles Murray The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life (Free Press, New York, 1996).  
50 Mill On Liberty, above n 22, at 106.  
51 Waldron The Harm of Hate Speech, above n 43, at 195.  
52 At 196.  
53 Tom Kington “Italian Football Fans Stand Up for Their Right to be Abused by Their Rivals” The Guardian (9 
October 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/09/italian-football-fans-abuse-milan-napoli 
accessed 5 Jan 2014.  




appear dead but are merely repressed, and we ‘cannot rely on surface behaviour’.55 The flint may 
only to be struck once. Currently, even surface behaviour does not decisively point towards 
Waldron’s claim. For these reasons, Waldron’s claim that the debate is over is not a good foundation 
to counter legitimacy concerns of hate speech laws.  
VIII State Neutrality 
A Dworkin 
The dialogue between Dworkin and Waldron is a useful gateway into bigger questions about the 
proper role and identity of the state. Dworkin’s argument entails that the state must be completely 
neutral as its communities decide the moral and cultural environment; otherwise, if views are 
silenced by regulation, not every person has had the opportunity to ‘confirm his or her standing as a 
responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action’.56 State neutrality is seen in 
many quarters to be fundamental to democratic legitimacy, especially in media censorship. Since a 
state ought to reflect popular will, it cannot choose sides when determining what the popular will is. 
Therefore, in the First Amendment tradition, speech relating to self-determination must be 
constitutionally protected. This is the essence of democratic self-government. 
B Meiklejohn’s Town Hall 
The most famous argument of its kind, Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory of self-government insists 
upon the importance of freedom of expression to a democracy.57 A democracy means agreeing that 
public issues must be decided by universal suffrage. Meiklejohn viewed democracy as ‘the voting of 
wise decisions’.58 A democracy is imagined as a town hall meeting, where the state resides as chief 
moderator. The moderator’s primary job is to keep speech flowing so that the audience can received 
all ideas necessary to make a fully informed decision. The moderator can step in, as speech may be 
curtailed ‘as the doing of the business under actual conditions may require’.59 Speech inconsistent 
with ‘responsible and regulated discussion’ ought to be shut down.60 Therefore, ‘what is essential is 
not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said’.61 This might sound 
like hate speech may be regulated, but what Meiklejohn meant is that private speech is not protected 
by freedom of expression. Public speech ‘admits of no exceptions’, and so must include racist or 
                                                             
55 Stephen Holmes “Waldron, Machiavelli, and Hate Speech” in Michael Herz and Peter Molnar (eds) The 
Content and Context of Hate Speech (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) 345 at 350.  
56 Dworkin, above n 19, at vii.  
57 Alexander Meiklejohn Political Freedom: The Constitutional Power of the People (Harper & Bros., New 
York, 1960).  
58 At 26.  
59 At 24.  
60 At 24.  
61 At 26.  
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hateful speech.62 If this is not the case, then the state has picked a side in the debate, and its 
democratic legitimacy is undermined. The United States Supreme Court characterised the issue of 
democratic legitimacy similarly to Meiklejohn in R.A.V v City of St. Paul. The Court struck down a 
local ordinance that banned erecting burning crosses, concluding that ‘St Paul…has no authority to 
license one side of the debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other follow Marquis of 
Queensbury Rules’.63  
Unintentionally, Meiklejohn’s state as moderator metaphor helps to explain why upstream laws may 
serve to protect democratic legitimacy, rather than to spoil it. Meiklejohn allows hate speech to have 
its time at the town hall meeting, but does not permit abusive speech. Yet, many countries enact 
upstream laws intending to draw the same line – hateful speech may be legal whereas speech that 
incites hatred in a group may be prohibited. Meiklejohn’s town hall scenario works at a procedural 
level of democracy. For example, if the moderator effectively allows every person present sixty 
seconds of speaking time, then this seems like a healthy form of democracy. There is a temporal 
restraint, but the moderator is indifferent as to the content.  In reality, some speakers may be 
dissuaded from speaking up and expressing their viewpoints because their opponents treat them as 
inherently inferior. If this is the case, then the town hall meeting is not truly democratic – perhaps 
the moderator may have to restrain some viewpoints if they are expressed too vituperatively.  
C The Fair-Minded Parliamentarian 
Owen Fiss also sees the state acting as a ‘fair-minded parliamentarian’, ensuring that all views of 
society are presented.64 Fiss sees the state playing a more active role than Meiklejohn does. The 
principle of content neutrality, Fiss argues, is important in combatting the concern that the state 
might use its coercive power to skew public debate in advancement of certain outcomes.65 When 
private parties skew debate, however, this is when the moderator should step in to promote free and 
open debate. Threats to freedom of expression do not solely emanate from the state – the principle 
might be under attack from private actors, too. So, for Fiss, the state should disfavour particular 
viewpoints and ‘make judgments based on content…but only to make certain that all sides are 
heard’.66 Put another way, enacting upstream laws is simply the moderator telling one side to turn 
down the volume so all parties can be heard.  
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D Post and Public Discourse 
Robert Post provides a ‘participatory theory’ theory of state neutrality.67 According to Post, self-
governance is located in ‘processes through which citizens come to identify a government as their 
own’.  Like Fiss, Post criticises Meiklejohn’s analogy, but goes even further by rejecting the state-
as-moderator metaphor altogether. Post focusses on the need for citizens to experience ownership of 
the state. For this to occur, the state must not prevent its citizens from participating in the 
‘communicative processes relevant to the formation of democratic public opinion’.68 These processes 
are identified as the ‘public discourse’.69 In the context of hate speech, upstream laws cut out citizens 
from participating in the public discourse. What is important for Post is the autonomy of a state’s 
citizens, rather than the quality of public discourse.  
For Post, the state can never function as a neutral moderator. A moderator must distinguish between 
the relevant and irrelevant, the abusive and the forceful, and so on. Post argues that the state cannot 
possibly remain neutral when undertaking this task. This is because public discourse is ‘the site of 
political contention about the nature of collective identity’.70 In determining what is relevant and 
what is not, the moderator must refer to some collective identity as a reference point. In doing so, the 
state pre-empts the democratic process in which citizens form their collective identity. In Post’s 
participatory approach, hate speech in the public discourse cannot be regulated because the content 
of hate speech is a matter of ‘public concern’.71 Post therefore comes to the slightly unpalatable 
conclusion that irrational and abusive speech can serve as bases for democratic legitimacy.72   
It is important to note the public-private distinction in Post’s participatory theory. The state can and 
should regulate hate speech in non-public domains, such as in the workplace and within universities. 
It is at the public level of social order labelled ‘democracy’ where upstream laws weaken democratic 
legitimacy. In Post’s view, public discourse is the arena where the will of individual citizens 
becomes the general will of the demos. Yet, it is not difficult to picture this arena becoming too 
gladiatorial and perhaps antidemocratic. This is especially the case if irrational and abusive speech 
are permitted. At its extreme, hate speech wholly disregards the autonomy of other citizens. Suppose 
a white supremacist group implores black citizens to leave the area because they are inferior. In this 
example, one group of citizens does not respect the autonomy of another. How, then, can democratic 
deliberation take place? For citizens to come together and form the general will, mutual respect is 
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required. Upstream laws may correct this by encouraging participation by more citizens. As Fiss 
says, upstream laws function to ‘enhance the public’s capacity to properly exercise…the right of 
collective self-determination’, rather than to usurp the right.73 Democratic legitimacy may therefore 
be strengthened.  
E The Role of Mutual Respect Between Citizens 
Post argues that mutual respect has no place in public discourse. He thinks that mutual respect is a 
norm of a particular ‘community’, a ‘social formation that inculcates norms into the very identities 
of its members’.74 These norms are to be suspended ‘so that citizens can freely determine how they 
wish to live’,75 in the name of democracy. As Steven Heyman suggests, this appears to be an 
artificial distinction between a democracy and a community.76 To allow for democratic deliberation, 
there must be minimum standards of respect and dignity. One important ground-rule is that each 
citizen must recognise other citizens’ equal standing in society. As Post himself concedes, 
democracy ‘depends in some measure on the spontaneous persistence of civility’.77 What Post 
misses is the possibility of this spontaneity remaining latent. If civility never materialises, then the 
state will have to externally impose restrictions on public discourse to maintain democratic 
legitimacy. This is the essence of ‘civic republicanism’, a theory of democracy favoured by 
academics such as Fiss and Cass Sunstein.78 They argue that democracy suffers from the ‘lack of a 
fully participatory body politic’.79 The focus is still on democratic participation, but at a universal 
level, rather than at individual autonomy.  
IX Democratic Relativism 
A France and Holocaust Denial  
From the above discussion, it is clear that Dworkin’s concept of democratic legitimacy is not 
universally shared. Exploring France’s regulation of Holocaust denial, Julie Suk presents a radically 
different model of democratic legitimacy.80 Since the Vichy regime was overthrown, France has 
used criminal law as a ‘realm of memory’ in facing their collective responsibility for the Holocaust.81 
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Alongside pre-existing general upstream laws, Holocaust denial was criminalised in 1990, carrying a 
maximum sentence of one year’s imprisonment.82 The ‘loi Gayssot’ banned the public contestation 
of ‘the existence of crimes against humanity’, directly referencing the Holocaust.83 Holocaust denial, 
of course, is a specific type of hate speech: usually, the intended inference is that the Jewish people 
concocted the genocide in order to win sympathy for the creation of Israel.84  
Dworkin’s formal democratic legitimacy would have no place for the loi Gayssot. Indeed, after the 
Danish cartoon controversy, Dworkin took the opportunity in a Guardian column to call for ‘a new 
understanding of the European Convention on Human Rights that would strike down the Holocaust-
denial law’.85 Every citizen must have their say. Suk takes the opposite view in the French context. 
Suk firstly notes that very few prosecutions occur under the Gayssot. Also, most prison sentences are 
suspended, and the usual punishment is a criminal fine. Holocaust deniers are not de facto silenced. 
Rather, the Gayssot functions to ‘strongly express the state’s moral outrage’.86 For Suk, arguments as 
to whether or not the Gayssot actually function to suppress anti-Semitic expression (or to spread it) 
miss the point.  
The Gayssot does not undermine democratic legitimacy – in fact, Suk argues that democratic 
legitimacy actually requires this law. The state must choose (and must be seen to have chosen) the 
anti-racism side. Suk explores the historical background to the Gayssot, and explains that the active 
role of the state has been embedded in the post-World War II constitutional order.87 Throughout 
modern French legal history, hate speech laws were enacted ‘not only to protect individuals subject 
to racist speech, but to reconceptualise the victim of racist speech as the republic itself’ (emphasis 
added).88 Presumably, this is why upstream laws in France are within the criminal law rather than 
under the civil heading. Because freedom of speech was seen as a means to protect the republican 
state, hate speech laws were regarded as fully compatible with and buttressing democratic 
legitimacy. If strong hate speech laws are not present, then this could lead to the pernicious 
conditions that dismantled the French republic in the 1930s.  
It is clear in Suk’s arguments that context matters – she does not argue for strong upstream laws to 
be implemented in the United States. Indeed, she argues that the constitutional identities of France 
and the United States are very different. Constitutionally, ‘the people’ are always deemed to be 
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sovereign in the United States.89 Within the United States constitutional framework, Robert Post’s 
insistence that the state be neutral makes more sense: once the state picks a side, the constituent 
power of the people cannot legitimately self-govern. In France, ‘the Republic remains 
sovereign…this means that some values and political outcomes are not up for grabs’.90 The 
republican form of government is eternally enshrined in France.91 This leads Suk to conclude that 
France’s legitimacy is reliant on its adherence to republican values, whereas democratic legitimacy 
in the United States has historically depended on the state allowing all voices to have their say.  
B Post’s Volte-Face  
As recent as 2007, Post was steadfast in the universal application of his participatory theory.92 
Interestingly, Post appears to have since drastically altered his staunch anti-upstream laws stance. He 
acknowledges that the United States and Europe hate speech jurisprudence arrive at different 
conclusions of where democratic legitimacy is found. Firstly, Post argues that the First Amendment 
tradition is extremely protective of expression because public discourse ‘has the extraordinarily 
difficult task of ensuring difficult task of ensuring democratic legitimacy in a climate of 
comparatively severe suspicion and distrust’.93 In contrast, Europe is a ‘comparative newcomer’ to 
democracy, and purportedly defers to political authority as though a monarchy still reigned 
supreme.94 In Post’s view, this point of difference means that European democracies do not need to 
keep public discourse open to all individual participation.  
So far, this is consistent with his universal participatory theory – European democracies suffer from 
reduced democratic legitimacy because the citizens are too deferential to question their states’ 
actions. His second hypothesis, however, concerns ‘the relative imperative on the two continents of 
sustaining community identity’.95 Post expands upon this in an interview with Peter Molnar, 
conceding that ‘participation in opinion formation in certain ways, in certain countries, in certain 
national contexts, destabilizes democracy rather than legitimizes it’.96 At a formal level, Post still 
believes that restricting hate speech constitutes a breach of democratic legitimacy. His recent 
concession is a major one, though, recognising that not all democracies find their legitimacy in this 
formal construction of democratic participation: ‘which forms of speech will and will not make the 
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state more democratically legitimate is in part a historical question’.97 Therefore, in stark contrast to 
his participatory theory, a state can impose a collective identity on its citizens without relinquishing 
democratic legitimacy. Suk’s example of the loi Gayssot illustrates Post’s new-found democratic 
relativism. Of course, Dworkin would reject Post’s relativism. For Dworkin, the principle of free 
speech is intrinsically linked with democratic legitimacy. To those that defend upstream laws on the 
basis of historical context, he dismisses them by saying that ‘they may be right about the impact of 
history on conviction…however, explanation of a conviction’s genesis is not an argument for its 
truth.’98 
C Heinze’s Criteria 
Although conceding historical context informs the makeup of a particular democracy, Post’s 
comments are not particularly helpful in deciding when upstream laws serve to enhance democratic 
legitimacy, rather than to diminish or spoil it. With context in mind, regulating Holocaust denial in 
France seems more legitimate than regulating it in India, for instance. In a forthcoming article, Eric 
Heinze attempts to establish criteria for determining when upstream laws buttress legitimacy. Heinze 
uses the ‘long standing, stable and prosperous democracy’ paradigm.99 A ‘long-standing’ democracy 
is where general norms and practices have generalised within its citizen population; a ‘stable’ 
democracy is one that can police itself via alternative means (like downstream laws) such that 
particular viewpoints do not need to be suppressed. A prosperous democracy is ‘sufficiently wealthy 
to maintain effective penalties against violence and discrimination, as well as non-punitive means of 
combating intolerance and protecting vulnerable individuals, while preserving viewpoint neutrality 
within public discourse’.100 If a state satisfies these criteria, Heinze argues, then any upstream laws 
weaken a state’s democratic legitimacy. His argument ought not to be pre-empted here, but it is 
presented to add colour to Post’s enigmatic democratic relativism.  
X Concluding Thoughts on Theory  
Ultimately, the divergence of opinion on upstream laws stems from the differing views of the state-
citizen relationship. Both sides of the argument agree that the state is not really neutral, and that the 
state has an active voice in public discourse. For example, Post is encouraging of a president that 
implores the citizens to ‘raise the tone of public conversation’.101 The Dworkinian view would limit 
the coercive power of the state to downstream laws, whereas upstream proponents would enable that 
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voice to silence others via criminal sanctions and other means. Waldron and other hate speech 
prohibitionists see a greater role for the state to shape how its citizens act towards each other. 
Dworkin sees no such role. In his view, it is only government that owes its citizens equal concern; 
prohibitionists conflate ‘our responsibilities when acting collectively and coercively in politics and 
our responsibilities as individuals operating within the structure of coercive law’.102 Citizens are not 
saints, and they must be welcome to offend and be offended, to hate and be hated. 
This paper accepts that the Dworkinian position is a robust one to employ as the default setting. It is 
accepted that upstream laws will restrict how people can express certain views. With strong 
upstream laws, a person that vehemently believes one race is superior to another may not have their 
voice heard by the demos as strongly as they would have liked. Substantively and formally, this 
diminishes a voice from the democratic equation. All parties to the debate concede this much. For 
Dworkin and Post, the inquest into democratic legitimacy stops there – any ‘matter of degree’ relates 
to what the affected party is morally permitted to do in response. In this way, Dworkin and other 
opponents of upstream law treat democratic legitimacy as conceptually separate from the possible 
effects of hate speech.  
It is evident that prohibitionists believe that this is an essentially artificial separation. Although 
Dworkin has been characterised as a substantive democrat,103 his position here may not be 
substantive enough. If a group is targeted and denigrated by unbridled hate speech, then they may 
find it tough to participate in the political process. At the public level of ‘democracy’, they may not 
be able to comfortably air their opinions in a miasmic environment. Proponents of upstream laws are 
much quicker to account for these effects in the democratic ledger. If hate speech serves to shut out 
sections of society as they feel marginalised – Patricia Williams goes as far as to call this ‘spirit 
murder’ – then a democracy cannot truly represent its citizens.104 If upstream laws are in place, they 
may serve to provide for an even playing field in a democracy, as minority groups are protected and 
feel welcomed into the democratic debate.105 Hateful views will remain extant, but not to a level that 
denies dignity and self-development to sections of society. The actual effects of hate speech and its 
regulation are much disputed: Waldron can point to the Yugoslavian example as easily as Heinze 
can point to Holocaust denial bans that counter-productively elevate David Irving.106 Although the 
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effects are still hotly contested, to ignore possible anti-democratic effects of hate speech is to 
undermine the pro-democratic argument against upstream laws. Both approaches seek to provide a 
democratic playing field for public discourse, and both seek the same outcomes. The rules, however, 
are very different.  
XI Canada 
A The History of Upstream Laws in the Criminal Code 
This paper will now examine how Canada has treated the concept of democratic legitimacy with 
regards to hate speech. Three intertwining pieces of legislation are central to this discussion: the 
Criminal Code; the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and the Canadian Human Rights Act. Firstly, 
the history of upstream laws in the Criminal Code will be examined.  
In apparent contrast to its southern neighbour, Canada’s laws reflect a commitment to cultural 
diversity and towards an ‘ethnic mosaic’.107 Multiculturalism in Canada has not always had an easy 
ride, however, and the 1960s saw the rise of extremely hateful propaganda. Anti-Semitism was rife 
in Ontario and Quebec, and white supremacist groups migrated from the United States and became 
active. For example, the National White Americans Party widely distributed pamphlets calling for 
the immediate sterilization of Jews, and claimed that ‘negroes…are on a much lower level to the 
whites’.108 Public concern led to the creation of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda (the 
Cohen Committee) in 1965. The Cohen Committee was tasked with addressing hate speech in a way 
that ‘balanced the need to suppress the malice and poison of [hate speech] with the need to keep 
open all proper lines of free expression in a democratic society’.109 The Cohen Committee’s Report 
recommended that upstream laws be enacted at the federal level for the first time. Bill C-53 was 
introduced into Parliament in 1969, and came into force a year later. Upstream laws are now found 
in sections 318-320.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code. Section 319(2) is of particular importance 
here. This section criminalises the communication of statements, other than in private conversation, 
that wilfully promote the hatred of any identifiable group.110 A breach of s 319(2) could lead to 
imprisonment for up to two years.  
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B Why Criminalise? 
Although the Bill was initially concerned with the effects of hate speech, the notion of democratic 
legitimacy has been a constant presence in the history of the Criminal Code. At the second reading 
of the Bill, Justice Minister John Turner passionately defended criminalizing hate speech. Turner 
argued that using the criminal law sanction was ‘an articulation of the total integrity of the Canadian 
community’.111 This was a clear example of what Post and Dworkin would see as spoiling 
democratic legitimacy: the state is operating as an active moderator of its citizens’ expressions and it 
is thus circumventing democratic self-government. Therefore, Canada’s downstream laws and 
general legitimacy may be called into question.  
Like with Holocaust denial laws in France, it is notable that Canada has chosen to focus on the 
criminalisation of hate speech. Turner’s comments illustrate that Canada itself was portrayed as the 
victim of hate speech: an attack on one section of the community constitutes an attack on the nation 
as a whole. To date, very few prosecutions are brought under s 319(2), and they require the consent 
of the Attorney General as a safeguard against frivolous complaints.112 This emphasises the symbolic 
function of Canada’s upstream laws: the point of s 319(2) is not to suppress sections of society, but 
to express the state’s opprobrium as to a particular viewpoint. The Government was confident that s 
319 (2) would advance democracy, rather than diminish it. However, prosecutions do occur, and it 
could be argued that sections of society have been made to conform to a moral and cultural 
environment they did not accede to.113 Since the 1970 amendments, have Canadian lawmakers 
shown any concern about the democratic legitimacy of upstream laws, or do they simply focus their 
attention at the consequential level? To answer this question, Canada’s primary constitutional 
document must be brought into the picture: the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
C The Charter 
Enacted in 1982, the Charter brought about profound change in the Canadian political and legal 
systems. Legislative and executive orders became judicially reviewable,114 and citizens could 
challenge the legitimacy of the state’s actions when fundamental rights were thought to be breached. 
After initial concern about judicial activism,115 the Charter is now extremely popular with Canadian 
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citizens and is championed for its role in nurturing multiculturalism. Both sides of the theoretical 
debate about upstream laws are contained in the Charter: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression… 
15 (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
27. This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians. 
Furthermore, the rights enshrined in the Charter are not absolute. Like many other Bills of Rights, 
the Charter contains a ‘limitations clause’. Section 1 provides that the rights and freedoms protected 
by the Charter are subject to ‘such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.’ This section means an enquiry into the constitutionality of 
a provision is a two-step process. This process has been used by the Canadian Supreme Court to 
strike an appropriate balance between upstream laws and freedom of expression.  
D Keegstra  
1 Background 
James Keegstra, a rather revisionist history teacher, informed his students that the Jews were, among 
other things, ‘sadistic’, ‘child killers’, invented the Holocaust for sympathy and were inherently 
evil.116 The students were expected to sit their exams mindful of this knowledge. If they dared to 
disagree with Keegstra’s historiography, then their marks would suffer.  
In 1985, Keegstra was convicted under section 319(2) of the Criminal Code.117 The Supreme Court, 
by a bare 4-3 majority, held that the provision was constitutional. At the first step of the inquiry, the 
provision violated the Canadian Charter’s enshrined right to freedom of expression.118 The Court 
was in complete agreement that the upstream law constituted a breach of s 2(b) of the Charter. 
Writing for the majority, Dickson CJ emphasised that it was not simply political expression 
protected by the Charter. As well a Supreme Court judge might, Dickson CJ agreed with Dworkin 
that majoritarian principles are not enough for democracy, stating that ‘the Charter will not permit 
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even the democratically elected legislature to restrict the rights and freedoms crucial to a free and 
democratic society.’119 
Canada’s upstream laws were constitutional, however, due to the ‘reasonable limits’ clause – the 
restriction was justified by references to principles fundamental to a free and democratic 
society.120The majority in Keegstra embarked on a lengthy quest to find these principles. Time was 
dedicated to the harm principle – like Waldron has done recently, the majority emphasised the 
importance of human dignity in regulating hate speech. Like Dworkin, the majority was sceptical of 
Mill’s advocacy for the marketplace of ideas, citing a study by the Canadian Parliament that ‘under 
strain and pressure in times of irritation and frustration, the individual is swayed and even swept 
away by hysterical, emotional appeals’.121  
More pertinently for this paper, the Court’s reasoning carries overtones of the concept of democratic 
legitimacy. Citing an earlier case,122 Dickson CJ enumerated two principles as to why freedom of 
expression was crucial to democratic legitimacy. Firstly, participation in social and political decision-
making is to be fostered and encouraged.123 Secondly, ‘diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment 
and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in a tolerant and welcoming environment for the sake of 
both those who convey a meaning and those to whom meaning is conveyed’. 124 
What is clear is that the majority in Keegstra did not think that hate speech legitimately contributed 
to political discussion, stating that ‘hate propaganda contributes little to…either the quest for truth, the 
promotion of individual self-development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where 
the participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged’.125 Of course, this does not rebut 
Dworkin’s central point – even if hate speech does not serve a political purpose, it must be allowed to 
form some part of a society’s ‘moral environment’. Also, James Keegstra was undeniably expressing a 
political opinion, no matter how repugnant. The Court, however, goes further, and allows for a nuanced 
view of democratic legitimacy. It does this in five ways.  
2 The Uniquely Canadian Democracy 
Firstly, Dickson CJ set out what he thought the values and principles of a democratic society should 
be:126 
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[the] respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and 
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society’.  
By reference to these principles and by rejecting the First Amendment tradition, Dickson CJ 
accepted the idea of democratic relativism. Counsel for Keegstra relied heavily on First Amendment 
jurisprudence, imploring the Court to import the Brandenburg test. Noting the constitutional 
commitments to equality and multiculturalism in the Charter, Dickson CJ explained that differences 
in democratic identity ‘may require that Canada's constitutional vision depart from that endorsed in the 
United States’.127 Democracy was not treated as a one size fits all concept. Rather, the uniquely 
Canadian vision of a free and democratic society required a positive commitment by the state to 
multiculturalism. This was informed by the constitutional guarantees of equality and adherence to 
multiculturalism. If the Canadian approach to democracy meant that hate speech was not afforded 
constitutional protection, ‘this is the approach which must be employed’.128  
Immediately in the majority judgment, we see a departure from the rigid framework of Dworkin - in 
Dickson CJ’s view, democratic legitimacy required the state to shape its citizens’ moral and cultural 
environment in order to adhere to multiculturalism. This reasoning by itself is flimsy, however. 
Although agreeing that the Charter has ‘constitutionalised’ multiculturalism, Stefan Braun points out 
that ‘it is hardly obvious that it does so by constitutionalizing legal suppression of public discourse 
suggesting alternatives to the official vision’.129  
3 A Matter of Degree 
Secondly, like Waldron, Dickson CJ adopted a moderate interpretation of Dworkin’s argument by 
treating democratic legitimacy as a matter of degree. Dickson CJ concedes that section 319 ‘undeniably 
muzzles the participation of a few individuals in the democratic process… the state therefore cannot act 
to hinder or condemn a political view without to some extent harming the openness of Canadian 
democracy and its associated tenet of equality for all’.130 In the Dworkinian sense, the state incurs a 
democratic deficit by not showing each citizen equal concern. But, Dickson CJ noted, ‘the degree of this 
limitation is not substantial’.131  Later on in the judgment, Dickson CJ emphasises that hate speech is ‘a 
special category of expression which strays some distance from the spirit of the [Charter] and [hence] 
restrictions on expression of this kind might be easier to justify than other infringements’.132 Waldron’s 
interpretation of Dworkin’s argument seems perfectly in line with the reasoning in Keegstra – if the 
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upstream laws are targeted at the vituperative end of the scale, and not merely at the offensive, then the 
democratic deficit is very minor. The inference is that downstream laws (and the general legitimacy of 
the state) are only spoiled very slightly by activity further upstream.  
4 Mutual Respect Between Citizens 
Thirdly, the s 15 right of equality informs Dickson CJ’s reasoning that democracy requires equal respect 
and concern between citizens, not just from the state to its citizens. The perpetrators of hate speech, the 
Court argues, aim to subvert the democratic process itself: ‘open participation [in the political process] 
must involve to a substantial degree the notion that all persons are equally deserving of respect and 
dignity’.133 If the democratic process is to be at all meaningful, hate speech that denies equal respect and 
dignity must be silenced. The long-term outlook of democracy depended on whether or not vulnerable 
groups could feel equally valued in wider society.134 Dickson CJ’s biographers believed that the Chief 
Justice was ‘quite prepared to deny individual rights that were incompatible with the continued survival 
of a distinctive community’. 135 This is very apparent in his civic republican approach to democracy.  
5 A Democratic Surplus? 
Fourthly, the majority seemed more concerned than Dworkin about the democratic participation of the 
targets of hate speech. Whilst subjected to hate speech, the victims cannot gain social standing in 
society. The democratic deficit incurred by hate speech laws is, in substance, outweighed by the 
democratic surplus afforded to victims of hate speech. The Court in Keegstra does not find this 
balancing act too difficult a task, because hate speech consists of expressive activity ‘wholly inimical to 
the democratic aspirations of the free expression guarantee’.136 Here is the affirmation of 
multiculturalism in action, by providing substantive notions of democratic legitimacy.  
6 The Role for the Criminal Sanction  
Fifthly, Dickson CJ was highly supportive of the use of the criminal law. It was contended that the 
criminal sanction of s 319(2) unacceptably impaired the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression. 
Mediation under human rights statutes was offered as a more conciliatory way to approach hate speech. 
In this way, the offender can amend their conduct without facing the stigma of the criminal law. The 
state could therefore still act as an active moderator and participant in public discourse without 
disbarring anyone from the town hall. Dickson CJ believed that this was not enough. Hate speech was 
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too loud and too potentially dominant in the public discourse. This called for the ‘more confrontational 
response’ of the criminal law.137 The majority of the Court was content for the state to issue a strong, 
condemning riposte in the marketplace of ideas.  
E Whatcott 
1 Background 
The Canadian Supreme Court has also been called upon to review upstream laws at the provincial level. 
For example, section 14 of the 1979 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code states that ‘no person shall 
publish or display…any representation that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or 
otherwise affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of prohibited ground’. 
Saskatchewan’s long-standing upstream laws were subjected to judicial review in 2013.138 William 
Whatcott, a ‘social activist’, distributed thousands of flyers warning of the perils of homosexuality. Two 
such flyers were entitled “Keep Homosexuality out of Saskatoon’s Public Schools!” and “Sodomites in 
our Public Schools”.139 The flyers compared homosexuality to paedophilia and child abuse.140 Whatcott 
was found to have violated s 14(1) under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, as the flyers exposed 
person to hatred and ridicule based on their sexual orientation.141 Following Keegstra, the Supreme 
Court held that the provision was constitutional: section 2 of the Charter was breached but the provision 
survived due to the ‘reasonable limits’ clause of section 1.142  
2 Democratic Deficit Denied 
The Court in Whatcott directly cites Dworkin as a proponent for leaving hate speech to the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’ in the search for truth.143 As outlined, Dworkin explicitly rejected the validity of this argument, 
and focussed on democratic legitimacy. The Court gives short shrift to this contention in any case. They 
stress that supressing hate speech does not necessarily lead to a democratic deficit, as hate speech can 
reduce and stifle the political participation of others. In essence, ‘speech that has the effect of shutting 
down public debate cannot dodge prohibition on the basis that it promotes debate’.144 Again, support for 
the notion that legitimacy is a matter of degree is evident, with factors to weigh up for and against. The 
Court also recognised that it is too simplistic to proclaim a cession of controversy on issues that hate 
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speech target. Yugoslavia, Darfur, Rwanda, Uganda were all pointed to, alongside the fact that the 
internet has enabled increased profligacy of extremist views.145  
Following Post’s lead, Whatcott contended that upstream laws force an illegitimate encumbrance upon 
some citizens in public discourse. The Court was unimpressed with this argument; in fact, it was the 
threat to freedom of expression from private actors that was the pressing concern. The Court 
hypothesised a downstream law that promoted anti-discrimination in schools as to sexual conduct and 
orientation. By labelling homosexuals as paedophiles, hate speech such as Whatcott’s ‘requires the 
protected group to first defeat the absolutist position that all homosexuals are pedophiles in order to 
justify a level of societal standing’.146 The protected group can only participate in the deliberative 
democratic process once this precondition is met. This is an alternative way to look at the upstream-
downstream analogy, and is aligned with civic republicanism: the Court reasoned that upstream laws 
must be in place in order for all to have their say further downstream.  
3 Religious Convictions and Treading Carefully 
Interestingly, the Court took the opportunity to distinguish between Whatcott’s flyers. Two of them 
were found to contain pure invective against homosexuality which was objectively likely to expose a 
vulnerable group to detestation and vilification. Nothing of substance was added to political discourse. 
The Court, however, was very careful to protect genuine political discussion.  Whatcott can express his 
views on sexuality – just not via hate speech.147 For example, one flyer reprinted the classified sections 
of a publication. Whatcott had scrawled “Saskatchewan’s largest gay magazine allows ads for men 
seeking boys” on the flyer, and added that “‘If you cause one of these little ones to stumble it would be 
better that a millstone was tied around your neck and you were cast into the sea’ Jesus Christ”.148 
According to the Court, this was not objectively likely to expose a group to hatred. The reasonable 
person would interpret biblical phrases aware that more than one message may be conveyed. This 
demarcation between political debate and hate speech is redolent of Waldron’s interpretation of 
Dworkin. The further the expression strays from the spirit of section 2 of the Charter, the less it would 
be afforded protection. As touched on, this feels a somewhat artificial difference. Dressed-up political 
rhetoric has immense latent potential to stir up racial hatred, perhaps more so than distributing flyers at 
universities. In fact, the Court explicitly acknowledges this, agreeing that ‘history demonstrates that 
some of the most damaging hate rhetoric can be characterized as “moral”, “political” or “public policy” 
discourse’.149 Nonetheless, they draw a line similar to Waldron in order to permit as much political 
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discussion as possible, and to recognise that deep-held religious beliefs can be inherently offensive to 
others.   
F Recent Developments 
The decision in Whatcott caused great controversy in Canada, with a groundswell of support for 
relaxing upstream laws. The main target was not the criminal sanction upheld in Keegstra, however. In 
June of 2013, the Senate repealed section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act 1977.150 This had been 
coming. Section 13 stated that it was a discriminatory practice to:151 
communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated … by means of the facilities of any matter 
that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or 
those persons are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
This very specific provision – aimed at one mode of communication – was due to the rise in Canada of 
telephone hate lines set up by extreme right-wing organisations in the 1970s.152 The Human Rights 
Commission screens all complaints and sends meritorious ones to the Human Rights Tribunal for 
adjudication. If necessary, the Tribunal can then order individuals to cease their discriminatory practices 
and levy penalties accordingly. In 2001, s 13 was amended to include hate speech on the internet within 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.153 There were a number of issues with the provision that distinguished it 
from the more accepted s 319(2) of the Criminal Code: the Attorney-General’s consent was not 
required, no defences were available, and individuals could freely and frivolously bring claims against 
other individuals. There was considerable backlash to the Human Rights Commission’s lead 
investigator’s stance that ‘freedom of speech is an American concept, so I don't give it any value. It's 
not my job to give value to an American concept’.154 It is concluded that although the treatment of 
democratic legitimacy regarding upstream laws is settled in the eyes of the judiciary, it remains an 
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XII New Zealand  
A History  
Like Canada, New Zealand has had upstream laws in place for many decades. Section 25 of the Race 
Relations Act 1971 (RRA) provided a criminal sanction for public hate speech, fulfilling New 
Zealand’s obligations under the ICCPR and the ICERD.155 The Race Relations Office received many 
complaints alleging breaches of s 25, but it had no jurisdiction to take the complaints further.156 
Widespread dissatisfaction with the operational limitations of s 25 led to the addition of s 9A to the 
RRA. This was a civil provision that made it unlawful to:157 
‘…publish or distribute written matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means 
of radio or television words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting…being matter or words likely to 
excite hostility or ill will against or bring into contempt or ridicule any group of persons in or who may be 
coming to New Zealand on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of 
persons’.  
 
The consensus then swung the other way: New Zealand’s upstream laws were now thought to be 
over-inclusive.158 Between 1980 and 1990, over half of the complaints to the Race Relations Office 
concerned s 9A of the RRA.159 A notorious case concerned Hana Te Hemara’s ‘kill a white’ 
comment at the Auckland University marae.160 After a tumultuous legislative and operational 
history, s 9A was repealed and superseded by the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA). The criminal 
sanction remained in place, but only one prosecution has succeeded under it or its predecessor since 
1971.161 Instead, the focus here is the civil standard of section 61 of the HRA. The key difference 
between s 9A of the RRA and s 61 of the HRA is the higher threshold of the latter: the words ‘ill 
will’ and ‘ridicule’ were omitted, and so potential harm is now limited to ‘hostility’ and ‘contempt’. 
On its face, s 61 is a fairly standard upstream law. There is no requirement for incitement to 
imminent violence – the likelihood of bringing a group into contempt is enough to be considered 
an unlawful practice. Because s 61 is not limited to two modes of communication, it is broader in 
scope than the corresponding s 13 in the Canadian Human Rights Act. In theory, both sections run 
into the same issue of democratic legitimacy that the Canadian Parliament was so eager to 
address. As will be seen, however, the New Zealand position is much less restrictive in practice. 
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B The Bill of Rights 
 
Since 1990, issues of freedom of expression in New Zealand are contextualised by the Bill of 
Rights Act (BORA). Where possible, enactments must be interpreted consistently with the rights 
and freedoms contained in the BORA.162 The relevant rights are located in sections 14 and 19:163 
 
14. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
19. Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of discrimination in 
the Human Rights Act 1993. 
 
Following the lead of Canada, section 14 is not merely limited to political expression. The right of 
s 14 has been characterised by the Court of Appeal ‘as wide as human thought and 
imagination’.164 
The real scope can only be deduced once the limitations clause of section 5 of the BORA is taken 
into account, which is identical to s 1 of the Canadian Charter.165 It is important to note that New 
Zealand’s constitutional makeup is very different from Canada’s. The New Zealand Supreme 
Court is not empowered with the ability to strike down legislation inconsistent with the BORA – 
this is explicitly outlined in the BORA itself.166 The jurisprudence on upstream laws is therefore 
less substantial than the detailed reasoning found in Canadian judgments.  
 
C Section 61 and Initial Concern 
Grant Huscroft, well-versed in the First Amendment tradition and outspoken critic of upstream laws, 
was dismayed at s 61 of the HRA. Given the guarantee of freedom of expression in the BORA, 
Huscroft could not believe ‘how a law this bad came to be re-enacted’.167 His concern was that the 
Human Rights Commission would trample all over freedom of expression and its importance to 
democracy.168 Channelling Post’s arguments, Huscroft believed that democratic legitimacy is 
weakened by s 61: ‘the state has no right to legislate in public discourse’.169 In an early case, the 
Human Rights Tribunal ruled that shock-jock Derek Archer had breached s 61 when broadcasting 
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racist remarks about Chinese people.170 As Luke McNamara notes, the Tribunal was perfectly 
comfortable with s 61 sitting alongside s 14 of the BORA.171 The Tribunal made specific reference 
to s 19 of the BORA, arguing that ‘freedom of expression carries with it the right not to infringe the 
rights of others’.172 So far, the similarities with the Canadian approach are abundant. The principles 
of non-discrimination and equality inform both countries’ upstream laws, and the mutual respect 
between citizens is a valid democratic justification. As it transpired, Huscroft need not have been 
troubled.  
D Approach of the Human Rights Commission 
In Bissett v Peters, the Human Rights Tribunal heard an application to strike out a claim made under 
s 61.173 The applicant was the New Zealand First MP Winston Peters, who had distributed a 
pamphlet that was widely regarded as racist towards Asian people.174 This was an unusual case 
where the Commission had declined to proceed, but Bruce Bissett (the complainant) had taken up 
the option of a Tribunal hearing anyway.175 In its submission to the Tribunal, the Commission stated 
that to be unlawful, the words published had to ‘invite a hostile action’ against a group.176 This is an 
extremely narrow reading of s 61 of the HRA, and one which is largely in line with the Brandenburg 
test. The lower threshold of ‘bring into contempt’, which the Canadian Human Rights Commission 
had adhered to, had been abandoned altogether. 
In explaining its high threshold, the Commission self-styled its approach as ‘civil libertarian’.177 This 
was contrasted with a ‘harms-based approach’.178 To demonstrate this difference, the Commission 
referred to the majority and minority judgments in Keegstra. Surprisingly, the Commission 
‘consciously lined up its position on how the right to free speech/hate speech law balance should be 
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E Support for Upstream Laws? 
In 2004, one year after Bissett, a Select Committee inquiry was launched to determine ‘whether or 
not further legislation to prohibit or restrain hate speech legislation is warranted’.180 Although the 
inquiry led nowhere, the Human Rights Commission’s submission illustrates why it had aligned with 
the approach of the minority in Keegstra. Although the Commission maintained that its extremely 
narrow interpretation of s 61 was ‘about right’,181 its submission carefully considered how upstream 
laws would affect democratic legitimacy. Firstly, in the vein of Dworkin, the Commission argued 
that freedom of expression is important in order for citizens to have confidence in laws preventing 
discrimination.182 Any democratic deficit incurred by upstream laws, however, is treated as a matter 
of degree. Citing Richard Delgado, a well-known proponent of upstream laws, the Commission 
believed that hate speech silences its victims, and ‘undermines the very democracy that free speech 
is said to undergird’.183 When hate speech fosters an atmosphere of discrimination, its victims ‘are 
denied the opportunity to participate equally in society’.184  
F The State as Active Moderator 
The reason for the Commission’s self-imposed high threshold pertains more to the inefficiency of 
dealing with frivolous complaints than any weight given to concerns such as Post’s and 
Dworkin’s.185 Besides a possible chilling effect, hate speech that is likely to bring an identifiable 
group into contempt is permitted in New Zealand, so long as imminent violence is not likely to 
ensue. If the threshold of s 61 has thus far been virtually unattainable, why did the Commission 
nevertheless caution against its repeal? The answer is found in the role of the state in the public 
discourse. The Commission stressed that the government ought to have a strong influence where 
private actors threaten freedom of speech.186 For the state to be seen as neutral, it must supply an 
active voice. To use freedom of speech as a philosophy for allowing hate speech to silence a group is 
to misunderstand ‘the proper role of Government’.187  
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G New Zealand’s Democratic Identity 
The above arguments are very much steeped in the prohibitionist camp. In line with this, there is a 
suggestion that the Commission would adopt the majority’s position in Keegstra if the democratic 
identities of Canada and New Zealand were more similar. The Commission noted that New 
Zealand’s Bill of Rights does not constitutionally guarantee the right to equality, and nor does it 
officially recognise multiculturalism.188 The democratic legitimacy of Canada’s upstream laws is 
infused by these two positive rights; the debate is contextualised.189 Conversely, the Commission 
does not balance sections 14 and 19 of the NZBORA when interpreting upstream laws. The 
Commission suggests that if s 19 was a positive right to equality, then this would alter the New 
Zealand conception of a democratic society. The Commission’s approach to s 61, it was suggested, 
would change accordingly.190  
H Recent Developments 
The Commission continues to employ s 14 of the NZBORA as a ‘shield of First Amendment-like 
proportions’.191 Because of how New Zealand’s legal system operates, it is the Commission’s 
approach that is crucial – not so much the legislature, nor the courts, and nor the Human Rights 
Tribunal. In its 2010 review, the Commission proposed a new positive right to equality and also to 
ensure that s 61 of the HRA fulfilled its legislative purpose.192 Neither of these propositions have 
made any substantial headway. The Human Rights Commission’s Annual Report for 2013 shows 
that although it received numerous complaints of breaches under s 61, not one reached the threshold 
to be held unlawful.193 The Commission referred to the ‘high threshold of the section 61 of the Act 
when balanced against the right to freedom of expression’.194 This is a continuation of the 
Commission’s very strong emphasis on s 14 of the BORA when weighing up s 61 claims.  
XIII Conclusion 
To the outrage of many human rights groups, the Australian Government has recently announced plans 
to repeal the hate speech laws in the Racial Discrimination Act.195 It can be seen that the line in the sand 
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is very difficult to draw in regards to hate speech. This paper has focussed the issue of democratic 
legitimacy that arises when hate speech is regulated. The succinct Foreword by Dworkin has proven 
fruitful for a much broader discussion, incorporating principles such as state neutrality and the relative 
democratic identities of states. Although this paper has found the arguments in favour of upstream laws 
to have more substance and force, it must be again stressed that the effects of hate speech are unclear.  
The operation of upstream laws in both Canada and New Zealand has been analysed. The Canadian 
Supreme Court has found to be acutely aware of the issue of democratic legitimacy. A moderate, civic 
republican approach to democratic legitimacy finds much favour north of the International Boundary – 
although public opinion appears to be shifting. It has also been seen that Canadian jurisprudence has 
strongly tied democratic legitimacy to its unique foci on equality and multiculturalism. The focus in 
New Zealand was on the Human Rights Commission. Essentially, it was expediency that drives the 
Commission’s strongly pro-speech stance. In spirit, it was seen the Commission tends to agree with the 
principles outlined by prohibitionists. The Commission was also found to favour the principle of 
democratic relativism, drawing attention to New Zealand’s lack of an express right to equality. It is 
concluded that democratic legitimacy is a fluid concept which means substantively different things to 
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